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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Alan Schulz appeals from the Judgment and Sentence wherein he received
a suspended unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, following his conviction
for felony injury to a child. 1 He asserts that the district court erred when it allowed an
emergency room doctor to testify about E.M.S.'s injuries portrayed on a picture, and the
mechanism used to impose the injury, even though he never examined E.M.S.
Additionally, the district court erred allowing certain impeachment evidence to be
admitted and argued during closing, because no inconsistent statements existed, and
the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly using the evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 29, 2009, E.M.S. and her father, Mr. Schulz, moved his television and
barbeque grill from E.M.S.'s stepmom's house to Mr. Schulz' home. (Tr., p.72, Ls.2022, p.73, Ls.16-19, p.74, Ls.11-16.) The homes were within close proximity to each
other.

(Tr., p.356, Ls.2-8.)

Mr. Schulz drove his truck and E.M.S. rode in the back

attempting to stabilize the items. (Tr., p.78, Ls.8-15.) Mr. Schulz yelled at E.M.S. when
she experienced difficulty balancing the items and her body. (Tr., p.79, Ls.1-12, p.80,
Ls.5-12, p.356, L.22-p.357, L.1.) Once at Mr. Schulz' home, the two lifted the items out
of the truck; however, they experienced difficulty in doing so. (Tr., p.81, Ls.6-12, p.83,
Ls.7-16, p.84, Ls.3-12, p.357, L.20-p.358, L.1.) According to Mr. Schulz and E.M.S.'s
trial testimony, no physical altercation occurred and Mr. Schulz, thereafter, drove E.M.S.

1

Mr. Schulz raises no issues in this appeal regarding his conviction for a misdemeanor
injury to a child.

1

back to her stepmother's home. (Tr., p.84, Ls.10-25, p.357, L.20-p.358, L.19.) Once
back at the stepmother's home, E.M.S. told her stepmom goodnight, and went to her
room. (Tr., p.100, Ls.23-25.) The stepmom did not notice anything unusual with E.M.S.
that evening. (Tr., p.100, L.19-p.101, L.1.)
The next day, E.M.S. covered her neck utilizing a scarf.

(Tr., p.102, Ls.2-3.)

While out on an errand, the scarf slipped down and the stepmom observed markings on
E.M.S.'s neck.

(Tr., p.102, Ls.21-25.) The stepmom contacted Mr. Schulz and then

contacted the Department of Health and Welfare. (Tr., p.103, Ls.7-8, 18-25.)
At the Department of Health Welfare, E.M.S. told Officer Sanchez that her dog
had jumped on her causing the bruising on her neck. (Tr., p.26, L.25-p.27, L.1.) The
caseworker requested the stepmother take E.M.S. to a doctor. (Tr., p.105, Ls.20-21.)
The stepmother took E.M.S. to their regular pediatrician. (Tr., p.105, Ls.23-25.)
The pediatrician, Dr. Rau, examined E.M.S. on June 30, 2009. (Tr., p.33, Ls.1722.) He observed bright red/purple marks on her neck. (Tr., p.35, Ls.6-9.) He thought
the bruises appeared symmetrical on both sides of her neck.

(Tr., p.35, Ls.13-16.)

Therefore, he believed the bruises were probably the result of a "nonaccidental trauma."
(Tr., p.35, Ls.17-20.)

Dr. Rau did not believe the bruises were consistent with the

mechanism of injury that E.M.S. had described (the dog stepping on her neck).
(Tr., p.36, Ls.22-25.)

Due to the symmetry and uniformity on both sides of E.M.S.'s

neck, Dr. Rau did not believe that a person could have inflicted the injury to E.M.S.'s
neck with one hand. (Tr., p.51, Ls.2-6.)

Although the doctor testified at trial that he

thought the mechanism of injury was strangulation (Tr., p.39, Ls.1-7, p.44, Ls.8-10), he
failed to conduct a complete eye examination; however, he did note the lack of the
presence of petechia (Tr., p.41, Ls.16-17). Dr. Rau did not notice any unusual problems
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relating to the bruising on E.M.S.'s neck, including the lack of petechia behind E.M.S.'s
ears and face. (Tr., p.42, Ls.10-16.)
After the caseworker confronted E.1\/1.S. with Dr. Rau's report, E.M.S. changed
her story. E.M.S. began to tell everyone that her father had grabbed her neck while the
two unloaded the barbeque grill and television. She testified to this version of events at
pretrial hearings; however, she told the jury that she had lied in those prior hearings.
She told the jury that her father did not cause the bruising on her neck.
The prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Schulz by Information with the crimes of
felony injury to a child and misdemeanor injury to a child.2 (R., pp.62-63.) As for the
felony, the State alleged that on June 28, 2009, John Schulz injured his child, E.M.S.,
by choking her, violating Idaho Code § 18-1501(1).

(R., pp.62-63.)

Regarding the

misdemeanor, the State alleged that on April 12, 2009, Mr. Schulz injured his child,
E.M.S., by beating her with a belt. (R., pp.62-63.) Prior to trial, the district court granted
Mr. Schulz' motion to sever the criminal counts against him.

(R., pp.148-149.) The

charges were bifurcated for trial purposes. 3 (R., pp.148-149.)
In response to a number of pretrial motions filed by both parties, the district court
issued an Order On Motions In Limine.

(R., pp.231-232.)

The court prohibited any

mention of a No Contact Order between Mr. Schulz and his daughter; however, it did
allow the parties to inquire into the conversations that occurred between the two.
(R., pp.231-232.) The court authorized the parties to utilize the prior preliminary hearing

2

Initially the State charged this case as a felony domestic battery and an attempted
strangulation. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 864 (2011 ). The district court dismissed
the charges because it determined that E.M.S. did not meet the definition of household
member as defined by the Idaho Legislature. Id. at 865. The Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's interpretation and dismissal of the charges. Id. at 867-68.
While the case was pending on appeal, the prosecutor filed this instant case.
3
After Mr. Schulz' conviction, he pied guilty to the misdemeanor injury to a child charge.
3

transcripts to question

M.S. should her testimony at trial vary from other court

testimony. (R., pp.231-232.) The court prohibited any testimony relating to Mr. Schulz'
criminal convictions.

(R., pp.231-232.) The court placed no prohibition on testimony

relating to the Department of Health and Welfare. (R., pp.231-232.) Finally, the court
prohibited the results of the polygraph taken and passed by Mr. Schulz. (R., pp.231
232.)
The State knew that the pediatrician, Dr. Rau, who had observed

M.S. did not

handle strangulation type of cases and, therefore, intended to call a different expert to
testify about strangulation. (Tr., p.17, Ls.1-6; p.18, Ls.5-7.) The State recognized that
Dr. Rau would not be able to testify about what could happen when a person was
choked or strangled.

(Tr., p.17, Ls.1-6.)

Therefore, the State planned to utilize an

emergency room doctor who experiences a couple of strangulation cases a year to
testify about the seriousness of strangulation, and to opine about bruises left after
strangulation.

(Tr., p.17, Ls.7-12.)

Prior to trial, Mr. Schulz objected to Dr. Malek's

testimony because he lacked the proper qualifications to give specific testimony about
the injuries on E.M.S.'s neck, because he lacked the expertise to diagnose someone he
has never examined. (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-8.) To clarify, Mr. Schulz' noted that providing
general testimony about strangulation was something quite different than testifying
about what happened to E.M.S. (Tr., p.18, Ls.10-18.) The latter testimony would be
improper and misleading to the jury and he requested that it not be allowed. (Tr., p.18,
Ls.10-18.)
The district court postponed a ruling on the motion.

(Tr., p.18, Ls.19-24.)

It

wanted to wait to see what the testimony would be before deciding the issue. (Tr., p.18,
Ls.19-24.) Regarding testifying about this specific case, the district court noted that it
4

would "have to wait and see what the question is and see what his qualifications are,
see what all he's reviewed to see if - see if he's done the same thing in other cases, for
example, see what kind of foundation is laid before I can make a decision on that"
(Tr. , p. 19, Ls. 1-7.)
Dr. Malek testified that he had been a doctor since 1981 and practiced in
emergency medicine since 1984.

(Tr., p.200, Ls.5-12, 21-23.)

He testified that on

average he sees two strangulation cases every year. (Tr., p.201, Ls.21-24.) Similar to
Dr. Rau, Dr. Malek testified that he received educational training on various components
that make up a person's neck and the interplay in strangulation cases.
Ls.12-15.)

(Tr., p.202,

Dr. Malek has no specialized medical training or expertise beyond that

necessary to become an emergency room doctor.

(Tr., p.218, Ls.6-9.)

The State

presented not testimony that Dr. Malek had ever diagnosed an injury from a picture or
had the capability of determining how an injury was caused without examining the
person.
Mr. Schulz again objected to Dr. Malek's testimony based upon relevance.
(Tr., p.203, Ls.5-7.)

The court understood the objection as the one that was lodged

prior to trial. (Tr., p.203, Ls.10-11.) The court ruled that it had heard the qualifications
of the doctor and, concluded that the objections would be overruled. (Tr., p.203, Ls.811.)
The doctor testified in general about the structure of the neck and the damage
strangulation could possibly cause to the body.

(Tr., p.203, L.15- p.207, L.11.) The

doctor also testified specifically about E.M.S.'s injuries, which based upon his
observations from the picture, were inconsistent with the doctor that actually examined
E.M.S. (Compare Tr., p.212, L.24-p.213, L.16 with Tr., p.44, Ls.3-18. (Dr. Rau testified

5

the bruises were symmetrical and were from a two hand manual strangulation.
(Tr., p.44, Ls.3-18.) Dr. Malek thought the bruises were not symmetrical (he never saw
the patient) and the injury appeared to be from a one hand manual strangulation.
(Tr., p.213, Ls.1-7.)))
E.M.S. made contact with her father about a year and half after the alleged
incident.

(Tr., p.170, Ls.18-21, p.171, Ls.2-5, p.171, Ls.17-24.)

From that point

forward, E.M.S. denied her previous accusations against her father and admitted that
the marks were caused by a boy giving her hickeys.

(Tr., p.17 4, L.25-p.175, L.3.)

E.M.S. testified that during the phone conversation she inquired into her 4Runner
because she had heard that it had been involved in an accident.

(Tr., p.172, L.23-

p.174, L.4, p.183, Ls.13-17.) The subject of college being paid by her dad due to his
disabled veteran status did not come up during the phone conversation.

(Tr., p.174,

Ls.11-15, p.183, L.18-p.184, L.9.) Although her dad had promise her a car and to pay
for college (via his Coast Guard Disabled Veteran status), these promises were made
prior to the alleged 2009 incident. (Tr., p.182, L.23-p.183, L.3, p.17 4, L.25-p.175, L.3.)
The prosecutor inferred with several witnesses that Mr. Schulz promised a car
and college for E.M.S.'s changed testimony. (Tr., p.259, L.21-p.275, L.22, p.289, Ls.423, p.296, L.20-p.300, L.11, p.309, Ls.4-15, p.330, L.21-p.335, L.15.)

Mr. Schulz'

objected arguing that the statements were not consistent and/or the question misstates
the evidence.

(Tr., p.264, Ls.15-20.) The district court believed that the statements

were inconsistent and allowed the prosecutor to continue with his inquiries. (Tr., p.264,
L.21-p.265, L.14.) the district court offered a limiting instruction that the evidence was
been admitted for the sole purpose of E.M.S.'s credibility.
Mr. Schulz declined the offer. (Tr., p.265, L.16.)
6

(Tr., p.265, Ls.12-14.)

The jury returned a guilty verdict.
Judgment Of Acquittal.
(Tr., p.410, Ls.6-12.)

(R., p.284.)

(R., pp.286-287.)

Mr. Schulz filed a Motion For

The district court denied the motion.

The court imposed upon Mr. Schulz a unified sentence of five

years, with two years fixed.

(R., pp.310-318.) The court suspended execution of the

sentence and placed Mr. Schulz on probation for three years.
Mr. Schulz timely appealed. (R., pp.322-325.)

7

(R., pp.310-318.)

ISSUES
1)

Did the district court abuse its discretion allowing Doctor Malek's testimony over
Mr. Schulz' objections because he was not qualified as an expert for the desired
testimony, and the State failed to lay a foundation for the basis of Doctor Malek's
opinions?

2)

Did the district court err when it allowed impeachment evidence that was based
erroneously on an inconsistent statement and, thereafter, the prosecutor
committed misconduct improperly eliciting the testimony and arguing the
substance of the erroneous answers in closing argument?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion Allowing Doctor Malek's Testimony Over
Mr. Schulz' Objections Because He Was Not Qualified As An Expert For The Desired
Testimony, And The State Failed To Lay A Foundation For The Basis Of Doctor Malek's
Opinions

A.

Introduction
Mr. Schulz asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed

Dr. Malek to testify about the specific injuries on E.M.S.'s neck and the causation of
those injuries. Mr. Schulz contends that the acceptance of Dr. Malek as an expert in his
area of expertise as an emergency room doctor, did not qualify him as an expert in
diagnosing injury from a picture and the mechanisms of causing the injury. Moreover,
the district court should have sustained Mr. Schulz' objections to Dr. Malek's testimony
about the causation of injury because the State failed to demonstrate the reliability of
the evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A district court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified

as an expert. Admissibility of expert testimony is also a matter committed to the
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that
discretion."

Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Setvices, 143 Idaho 834, 837 (2007)

(citations omitted). When examining whether the district court abused its discretion, the
appellate courts utilize a three-part test to determine whether error was committed.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within
the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
9

standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Id.

C.

The District Court Erred In Allowing Doctor Malek To Testify As An Expert In An
Area He Had No Expertise
Mr. Schulz asserts that the district court abused its discretion by determining that

Dr. Malek qualified an as expert to testify as to the injury and causation of the injury,
based upon a photograph of the injury.

Mr. Schulz recognizes that Dr. Malek is an

expert in the medical field and is generally qualified to testify about the bruising process,
the effects of strangulation, and the general appearance of a potential strangulation.
Mr. Schulz contends that the State failed to establish Dr. Malek as an expert able to
identify the exact injury imposed, based upon reviewing a photograph, and the
mechanism causing the injury seen on the photograph.
A witness must be qualified as an expert within the meaning of Rule 702 if he is
to give scientific, technical, or other specialized testimony.

'The proponent of the

testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that the individual is qualified as an
expert on the topic of his or her testimony." Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services,
143 Idaho 834, 837 (2007) (citing State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 330 (Ct. App. 2005)
(citing State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 855 (1992)).
The trial court's acceptance of the witness as an expert does not necessarily
qualify the witness to testify about all matters not relating to the witness's expertise.
See, Sidwell v. William Prym, Inc., 112 Idaho 76, 80-81 (1986). In Sidwell, the district

court determined that a professor of metallurgy was an expert and permitted him to
testify about the composition of the metal contained in the product in question, and the
characteristics of such metal as being ductile or brittle. Id.
10

at 80. The district court

sustained objections prohibiting the expert from testifying about the manufacture and
use of the product. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision
finding that the expert's qualifications were insubstantial and borderline at best and;
therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to prohibit the objected to
testimony. Id. at 81.
In West v. Stoke, 132 Idaho 133 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "[a]
witness may be qualified to render opinions about some things but not others." West
132 Idaho at 139 (citing Garrett Freightlines, Inc. V. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho
722, 733 (1987); Sidwell, 112 Idaho at 80-81).

The West Court affirmed the district

court's decision to prohibit an expert to testify about safe life span of an agricultural
tractor, although the court authorized his expert testimony about existence of a design
defect

Id.

The expert had experience working as a mechanic and as an accident

reconstructionist. Id.
In Garrett Freight/Ines, Inc. V. Bannock Paving Co, the Idaho Supreme Court
found it error for the district court to allow "Garrett's accident reconstruction expert to
render an expert opinion concerning whether the state's traffic control plan, as
designed, complied with industry standards as set forth in the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices (MUTCD)."

Garrett Freight/Ines, Inc. V. Bannock Paving Co., 112

Idaho 722, 732-33 (1987). The court found that he was an expert capable of testifying
about some things; however, not an appropriate expert to testify about other issues in
the case. Id.
In the instant case, Dr. Malek testified that he had been a doctor since 1981 and
practiced in emergency medicine since 1984. (Tr., p.200, Ls.5-12, 21-23.) He testified
that on average he sees two strangulation cases every year.
11

(Tr., p.201, Ls.21-24.)

Similar to Dr. Rau, Dr. Malek testified that he received educational training on various
components that make up a person's neck and the interplay in strangulation cases.
(Tr., p.202, Ls.12-15.)

Dr. Malek has no more specialized medical knowledge or

education than Dr. Rau, granted he had actually experienced two strangulation cases a
year. (Tr., p.218, Ls.6-9.)
Mr. Schulz again objected to Dr. Malek's testimony based upon relevance.
(Tr., p.203, Ls.5-7.)

The court understood the objection as the one that was lodged

prior to trial. (Tr., p.203, Ls.10-11.) The court ruled that it had heard the qualifications
of the doctor and concluded that the objections would be overruled. (Tr., p.203, Ls.8-

11 .)
The doctor testified in general about the structure of the neck and the damage
strangulation could possibly cause to the body.

(Tr., p.203, L.15- p.207, L.11.) The

prosecutor then began his inquiry into this specific case. (Tr., p.207, Ls.12-15.) The
prosecutor inquired into the injuries that were portrayed on the photos of E.M.S.
(Tr., p.209, L.8-p.212, L.17.) The prosecutor then asked, "Doctor, in your opinion, what
is the mechanism that caused those bruises." (Tr., p.212, Ls.18-19.) Over Mr. Schulz
objection to foundation, the doctor answered that the pictures were consistent with
strangulation. (Tr., p.212, Ls.18-23.)
The district court erred in overruling Mr. Schulz' objections.

The State laid no

foundation about Dr. Malek's experience or ability to identify types of injuries from
looking at a picture. The court should have prohibited the doctor from testifing that the
pictures appeared to be a bruise. There was no foundation showing that Dr. Malek had
the ability to interpret the shape and size of a bruise from a picture. It is ironic that the
examining doctor described the actual bruises quite differently then Dr. Malek, who was
12

utilizing a picture to reach his conclusions. There was no foundation laid that Dr. Malek
had ever been able to determine the cause of a bruise (in this case supposedly from
hands), from a photograph. Finally, there was no foundation laid to demonstrate that
Dr. Malek had the expertise to conclude that a bruise on a picture appeared to be
caused from a one-handed strangulation.
Mr. Schulz submits that there was no foundation to allow Dr. Malek to testify as
an expert in this area. While it is undisputed that he is qualified to testify about injuries
suffered from a patient he treated in the emergency room and to general knowledge that
he has about strangulation, there was no foundation laid qualifying him as an expert in
diagnosing injury from a photograph and determining the mechanism that caused the
injury. The district court erred in allowing the testimony. The State will not be able to
demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State v.

Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).

D.

The District Court Erred In Admitting The Expert Testimony Of Doctor Malek
Because The State Failed To Lay The Foundational Evidence To Demonstrate
The Reliability Of The Evidence
"The foundation for the admission of opinion testimony based upon scientific

knowledge includes both that the witness is an expert in the field and that there is a
scientific basis for the expert's opinion." Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A.,
138 Idaho 589, 593 (2003). Thus, besides qualifying the doctor as an expert, Rule 702
required the State to demonstrate that the testimony was based upon sound scientific
principles.

Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 837-38 (2007).

"Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is
inadmissible evidence.

Id. at 838 (citing Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807 (1999)).
13

Idaho has not adopted the Daubert's 4 standard for admissibility; however, it has used
some of these principles in assessing whether the expert's opinion is scientifically valid.

Id. Here, there was no scientific basis for the doctor's opinion.
The prosecutor began his inquiry into this specific case. (Tr., p.207, Ls.12-15.)
The prosecutor asked Dr. Malek, "Now, in terms of your experience with strangulation
type cases, does that experience include seeing bruising that is often the result of a
strangulation?" (Tr., p.207, Ls.16-19.) The doctor answered that he observed bruising
and then described the type of bruising he sees. (Tr., p.207, L.16-p.208, L.11.) The
prosecutor then inquired into the injuries that were portrayed on the photos of E.M.S.
(Tr., p.209, L.8-p.212, L.17.) The prosecutor then asked, "Doctor, in your opinion, what
is the mechanism that caused those bruises." (Tr., p.212, Ls.18-19.) Over Mr. Schulz
objection to foundation, Dr. Malek answered that the pictures were consistent with
strangulation. (Tr., p.212, Ls.18-23.) Dr. Malek's continued to explain why he thought
that it appeared to be strangulation.

(Tr., p.212, L.24-p.213, L.16.)

The doctor's

testimony was inconsistent with Dr. Rau's testimony. (Compare Tr., p.212, L.24-p.213,
L.16 with Tr., p.44, Ls.3-18.)

Dr. Rau's personal observations were that the bruises

were symmetrical, roughly equal on both sides, and the injuries appeared to have been
caused by two hands - due to their symmetry.

(Tr., p.44, Ls.3-18.)

Dr. Malek's

interpretation of the photos, which is not in his field of expertise as an emergency room
physician, noted that the bruises were not symmetrical:
bruising starts higher on the neck, goes down to the bottom of the neck
and then back up again. Much as you would think of your hand formed in
a cup and with the bruising higher up on the one side, the cup between
your thumb and index finger here, and then bruising here on the opposite
side from potentially the thumb.

4

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993).
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(Tr., p.213, Ls.1-7.) Dr. Malek testified that the bruising was more consistent with a
one-handed strangulation. (Tr., p.213, Ls.8-11.) Moreover, Dr. Malek testified that the
bruises were not consistent with hickeys. (Tr., p.213, L. 17-p.214, L.7.) Dr. Malek also
testified about the amount of force that would be needed to create the bruises that were
portrayed on the picture, although no foundation had been laid that he has the expertise
to tell the jury about the amount of force necessary to result in types of bruises see in
the photo. (Tr., p.215, Ls.5-22.) On redirect, Dr. Malek testified that it appeared to be
the right hand of a person to have inflicted the marks on

M.S.'s neck. (Tr., p.224,

L.22-p.225, L.5.)
Dr. Malek is an emergency room doctor who has treated individuals arriving at
the hospital: Dr. Malek has not been in the business of diagnosing injuries from a
photograph and determining the exact cause of a bruise from a photograph. The State
failed to demonstrate any scientific reliability of the doctor's opinion.

There was no

evidence that this type of diagnoses was common practice, accepted in the general
medical community, and had any reliability. There was no evidence demonstrating that
Doctor Malek could look at a picture and tell what instrument (in this case an alleged
hand) that caused the injuries observed.

The district court should have sustained

Mr. Schulz' objections.

E.

The District Court's Error In Admitting The Doctor's Testimony Specific To E.M.S.
Was Not Harmless
Erroneously-admitted evidence tending to show that the

M.S. was strangled, is

prejudicial to the defendant. The evidence bolsters Dr. Rau's testimony in that it makes
the jury more likely to believe that Mr. Schulz strangled E.M.S. The doctor's
erroneously-admitted testimony vouched for E.M.S.'s pretrial hearing testimony, in that
15

it explained a difference between Dr. Rau's opinion and

M.S.'s pretrial hearing

testimony, regarding whether one or both hands were alleged used.
Given the implications for Mr. Schulz in the eyes of the jurors, it cannot be said,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same guilty verdict
had it not been for Dr. Malek's testimony.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed Impeachment Evidence That Was Based
Erroneously On An Inconsistent Statement And, Thereafter, The Prosecutor Committed
Misconduct Improperly Eliciting The Testimony And Arguing The Substance Of The
Erroneous Answers In Closing Argument
The district court erred in allowing the prosecutor to question witnesses about
consistent statements under the guise of impeachment.

Moreover, although the

statements were consistent, the prosecutor inferred that certain statements were
inconsistent and used the inferred inconsistency for substantive proof, not to question
the credibility of the witness.
Any party has the right to attack the credibility of a witness. I.R.E. 607. "Under
I.R.

613, inconsistent out-of-court statements may be used to impeach a witness' trial

testimony." State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241,248 (Ct. App. 1994}. The rule provides:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not
admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny
the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate
the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This
provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in
Rule 801 (d)(2).
I.R.E. 613 (emphasis added). Additionally, questions asked for the purposed purpose
to impeach under the guise of putting improper evidence before the jury is not allowed.
See State v. Stewart, 100 Idaho 185 (1979).
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During cross examination E.M.S. testified that she contacted her father during
Christmas break while visiting her biological mother in North Carolina.

(Tr., p.170,

Ls.18-21, p.171, Ls.2-5, p.171, Ls.17-24.) E.M.S. testified that during their contact, they
discussed how her dad was doing, if he had any work, girlfriends, or pets. (Tr., p.173,
Ls.20-22.) E.M.S. also testified that she inquired into whether her father still had her
4Runner because she had heard that it was involved in an accident. (Tr., p.172, L.23p.174, L.4, p.183, Ls.13-17.) She testified that her dad still had the vehicle for her and
that her decision to testify that the marks were not caused by her dad had nothing to do
with the vehicle.

(Tr., p.174, Ls.7-10.)

She further explained that the 4Runner had

been promised to her for a long time, that it was supposed to be hers when she
obtained her driver's license. (Tr., p.182, L.23-p.183, L.3.) She testified that the subject
of college did not come up during their contact because she gets free college due to her
father's service in the Coast Guard, and that has been the case forever. (Tr., p.17 4,
Ls.11-15, p.183, L.18-p.184, L.9.) E.M.S. testified that after having contact with her
father she started telling everybody that the bruises were not caused by her father but
instead were hickey marks. (Tr., p.17 4, L.25-p.175, L.3.)
Mr. Schulz was in the Coast Guard from 1994 through 2002. (Tr., p.351, Ls.2-3.)
He was honorably discharged due to being disabled. (Tr., p.351, Ls.4-10.) Mr. Schulz
testified that his children are entitled to receive benefits to attend college because he is
a disabled veteran.

(Tr., p.351, Ls.11-18.)

Mr. Schulz admitted that he spoke with

E.M.S. on the phone during Christmas 2010. (Tr., p.388, L.25-p.389, L.3.) However,
they did not discuss college during the phone conversation. (Tr., p.389, Ls.23-24.) Nor
did the two discuss having a vehicle for her during the 2010 phone conversation.
(Tr., p.389, L.25-p.390, L.2.)
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The prosecutor attempted to impeach E.M.S. with her caseworker, Loretta
Lotion. However, when Ms. Lotion testified that she did not discuss with

M.S.

MS.'s

phone contact with Mr. Schulz, there should have been no further inquiry into E.M.S.'s
statements about what if any promises Mr. Schulz may have made.

(Tr., p.259, L.21-

p.260, L.2.) The prosecutor, however, then asked if EM.S. ever told her that Mr. Schulz
made any promises to

M.S. (Tr., p.259, L.21-p.260, L.2.) The district court sustained

Mr. Schulz' objection, ruling that the testimony required a hearsay statement and was
not proper impeachment testimony. (Tr., p.260, Ls.3-15.) As an offer of proof outside
the presence of the jury, the caseworker explained that E.M.S. informed her that her
dad would be paying for college. (Tr., p.262, L.16-p.263, L.5.) The caseworker did not
inquire about how dad would be paying for it or any details about the Coast Guard
because E.M.S. simply indicated that Mr. Schulz would be paying for it. (Tr., p.263, L.6p.264, L.16.)

Mr. Schulz objected arguing that the statements were consistent and,

therefore, it would be improper impeachment testimony. (Tr., p.264, Ls.15-20.)
The district court felt that the two statements were inconsistent and, therefore,
allowed the State to inquire upon the jury's return to the courtroom. (Tr., p.264, L.21p.265, L.7.) The court offered to provide a limiting instruction informing the jury that the
testimony was being offered for the sole purpose of the consideration of

M.S.'s

credibility. (Tr., p.265, Ls.12-14.) Mr. Schulz declined. (Tr., p.265, L.16.) Thereafter,
the prosecutor asked the caseworker about promises E.M.S.'s dad made and she
answered that
Ls.6-7.)

M.S. told her that her dad promised to pay for college. (Tr., p.266,

The caseworker did not ask E.M.S. how Mr. Schulz was going to pay for

college. (Tr., p.275, Ls.10-16.) She also did not inquire when Mr. Schulz' promise to
pay for college had been made to E.M.S. (Tr., p.275, Ls.17-22.)
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The district court erred because the statement were consistent. E.1\11.S. testified
that her father had always agreed to pay for college because she would receive benefits
from her father's disabled veteran status. Ms. Lotion had no knowledge about how the
father would pay for college.

I\Jor did she have any idea when Mr. Schulz made the

promise. She had already testified that she did not talk with E.1\11.S. about the contact
that was made during Christmas 2010. Unless that promise can be shown to be made
during that time frame and not prior to the alleged 2009 incident, it has no relevance to
the case.
The prosecutor continued to infer that E.M.S. had been promised a car and/or
college to change her testimony during the cross examination of a number of witnesses.
During the cross examination of Jennifer Owney, the prosecutor inquired whether she
was aware that Mr. Schulz had made promises to E.M.S. during their Christmas
contact.

(Tr., p.288, Ls.9-13, 20-23.)

The court sustained an objection to the

prosecutor's inquiry about promises about college. (Tr., p.289, Ls.4-6.) The prosecutor
then asked: "Were you aware that they had contact and there had been a promise of a
car?" (Tr., p.289, Ls.7-9.) Mr. Schulz objected because it mischaracterized E.M.S.'s
testimony.

(Tr., p.289, Ls.9-11.)

The court overruled the objection and the witness

responded that she was not aware of any promises made to E.M.S. about a vehicle.
(Tr., p.289, Ls.12-14.) The prosecutor then asked, in referencing a different time period,
if the witness had been aware that E.M.S. had contact with her father.

(Tr., p.289,

Ls.20-23.) Again, the witness indicated that she did not, and also again testified that
she was not aware of any promises Mr. Schulz may have made to E.M.S. (Tr., p.289,
L.24-p.290, L.2.)
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During the cross examination of E.M.S.'s biological mom, the prosecutor inquired
whether she was aware of promises IVlr. Schulz made to E.M.S. (Tr., p.296, Ls.20-23.)
After the witness answered in the negative, the prosecutor asked if she was aware that
Mr. Schulz told E.M.S. that he was going to pay for college.

(Tr., p.296, Ls.20-25.)

Over Mr. Schulz' objection, the witness answered in the negative. (Tr., p.297, Ls.1-3,
13-16.)

During redirect, the witness testified that she thought the military paid for

Mr. Schulz' children's college education. (Tr., p.300, Ls.5-11.)
During the cross examination of E.M.S.'s maternal aunt, the prosecutor inquired
whether E.M.S. told her that she had been in contact with her father during Christmas
2010. (Tr., p.309, Ls.4-11.) In a follow up question, the aunt testified that she was not
aware of any promises that may have been made to E.M.S. (Tr., p.309, Ls.12-15.)
During the cross examination of Valerie Mills, a close family friend, the
prosecutor inquired whether E.M.S. told her that she had talked with Mr. Schulz.
(Tr., p.330, Ls.21-25.)

The family friend was not aware that they had spoken.

(Tr., p.330, L.24-p.331, L.2.) The prosecutor then asked if he was aware of whether or
not they had had contact with one another. (Tr., p.331, Ls.15-16.) The witness had no
idea that the two had had contact.

(Tr., p.331, Ls.17-18.)

When the prosecutor

inquired about the car, the witness told the prosecutor that Mr. Schulz has always had
the 4Runner for E.M.S.

(Tr., p.331, Ls.19-25, p.335, Ls.11-15.) The prosecutor then

inquired about college and received similar answers as the car: this witness did not
know there had been any specific promises made about college. (Tr., p.332, Ls.10-15.)
During the cross examination of Cathleen Foster, E.M.S.'s CASA advocate, the
prosecutor asked if she knew that E.M.S. had contact with her father around the
Christmas break time of 2010. (Tr., p.348, Ls.18-20.) Ms. Foster was not aware that
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the two had any contact.

(Tr., p.348, L.21.)

Additionally, she was not aware that

Mr. Schulz promised E.M.S. a car or had a car for her. (Tr., p.348, Ls.22-25.) Nor was
she aware that Mr. Schulz promised to pay for E.M.S.'s college. (Tr., p.349, Ls.1-3.)
In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated, "finally you have this evidence of
promises - the car, college, the moving in when turning 18. All of those things actually
support her testimony beforehand and explain what is going on with this young girl
today and why she testified the way she did before you folks." (Tr.Vol. II, p.59, Ls.7-12.)
The admission of the alleged impeachment testimony was improper. First, the
statements were consistent; therefore, not admissible under I.R.E. 613 (b). Second, the
prosecutor inferred an answer not consistent with the testimony.

The prosecutor

continued to infer that E.M.S. told people that her father made new promises of college
and a vehicle during Christmas 2010. Finally, the prosecutor argued the testimony for
purposes other than impeachment. Finally, even if the court correctly ruled the out-ofcourt statements admissible, they were not admissible to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. The prosecutor argued the evidence of supposed promises as substantive
evidence rather than merely impeaching evidence. The district court erred in allowing
the testimony to be heard over defense counsel's objections and the State cannot prove
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Schulz respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and remand the matter for a new trial.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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